Implement suggestion: https://hackmd.io/@mLAPku2WQZmso5oX4kzPOg/Bkn8SBKSn
Signed-off-by: AlienTornadosaurusHex <>
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@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import "../v3-relayer-registry/GovernanceStakingUpgrade.sol";
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contract GovernancePatchUpgrade is GovernanceStakingUpgrade {
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mapping(uint256 => bytes32) public proposalCodehashes;
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event CodehashDifferent(address target, bytes32 oldHash, bytes32 newHash);
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// The stakingRewardsAddress sets the immutable to the new staking contract
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constructor(
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address stakingRewardsAddress,
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@ -32,18 +30,9 @@ contract GovernancePatchUpgrade is GovernanceStakingUpgrade {
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proposalCodehash := extcodehash(target)
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}
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if (proposalCodehash == proposalCodehashes[proposalId]) {
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super.execute(proposalId);
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} else {
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// So this should guarantee that the proposal should not be able to be executed in future
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// But also, the proposal will be skipped each time. So the question is whether this, a silent
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// skip, or a require can be used to stay "concise", and abandon the safety of having also this assign
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// Outside dependencies, which don't exist as of yet, might believe that the proposal code was executed
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proposal.executed = true;
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require(proposalCodehash == proposalCodehashes[proposalId], "Governance::propose: metamorphic contracts not allowed");
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// Let the event signify it was metamorphic
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emit CodehashDifferent(target, proposalCodehashes[proposalId], proposalCodehash);
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}
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super.execute(proposalId);
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}
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// This should store the proposal extcodehash
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@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
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"test:f": "yarn prettier:fix && yarn test",
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"clean": "yarn prettier:fix && yarn lint",
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"compile": "yarn prettier:fix && yarn hardhat compile",
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"coverage": "yarn hardhat coverage"
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"coverage": "yarn hardhat coverage",
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"layout": "yarn hardhat check"
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},
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"author": "Tornado.cash team <hello@tornado.cash>",
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"license": "MIT",
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@ -264,25 +264,10 @@ describe('Gov Exploit Patch Upgrade Tests', () => {
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// Load the contract
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const maliciousProposal = await ethers.getContractAt('MaliciousProposal', maliciousProposalAddress)
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// Check that the malicious proposer is the deployer
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const deployer = await maliciousProposal.deployer()
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// Get bal before
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const deployerBalanceBefore = await torn.balanceOf(deployer)
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const governanceBalanceBefore = await torn.balanceOf(governance.address)
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expect(governanceBalanceBefore).to.be.gt(zero)
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// Now execute
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await governance.execute(proposalId)
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// Check bal after
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const deployerBalanceAfter = await torn.balanceOf(deployer)
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const governanceBalanceAfter = await torn.balanceOf(governance.address)
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// Protected
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expect(deployerBalanceAfter).to.equal(deployerBalanceBefore)
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expect(governanceBalanceAfter).to.equal(governanceBalanceBefore)
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await expect(governance.execute(proposalId)).to.be.revertedWith(
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'Governance::propose: metamorphic contracts not allowed',
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)
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// Terminate the contract for the next test
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await maliciousProposal.emergencyStop()
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