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Merge pull request 'Patch to show locking page' (#2) from AlienTornadosaurusHex/docs:en into en

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Theo 2023-06-08 23:01:00 +02:00
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1
general/guides/local-ui.md
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ _If you have privacy concerns about using this extension in this tutorial, you [
For this part you'll need to be able to open .zip files, most operating systems allow this. Head to either the Nova or Classic release page on the community git to download the static files. For this part you'll need to be able to open .zip files, most operating systems allow this. Head to either the Nova or Classic release page on the community git to download the static files.
Nova: https://git.tornado.ws/tornadocash/nova-ui-minified/releases Nova: https://git.tornado.ws/tornadocash/nova-ui-minified/releases
Classic: https://git.tornado.ws/tornadocash/classic-ui/releases Classic: https://git.tornado.ws/tornadocash/classic-ui/releases
Click the version named zip file download option to download the zip file, as seen below. It should download locally to your machine. Click the version named zip file download option to download the zip file, as seen below. It should download locally to your machine.

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general/token/locking.md → general/token/staking.md
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@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
# Locking in Governance # Locking in Governance
### Why? (See below on how to lock)
All Governance systems converge towards the same pattern of consensus systems based on some form of pluralism-based voting. This is for the reason, that large-scale coordination problems can only be resolved by giving "users" or "nodes" or "validators" (however you want to call it) an incentive to cooperate, and then bind that incentive within a ruleset which ultimately the "users/nodes/validators" will prefer because it encourages the stability of the system which actually supplies them the incentives, meaning that it economically guarantees them future income. All Governance systems converge towards the same pattern of consensus systems based on some form of pluralism-based voting. This is for the reason, that large-scale coordination problems can only be resolved by giving "users" or "nodes" or "validators" (however you want to call it) an incentive to cooperate, and then bind that incentive within a ruleset which ultimately the "users/nodes/validators" will prefer because it encourages the stability of the system which actually supplies them the incentives, meaning that it economically guarantees them future income.
For this reason, since the prime directive of the Governance "community" surrounding Tornado Cash is ensuring protocol and service stability, mechanisms must exist by which Governance can incentivize "users/validators/nodes" to configure a system around the core protocol contracts, which must act as a bridge between them and users wanting to interface with the protocol. Specifically, this is necessary due to the fee dilemma which has been mentioned in the guide for relayers, which states that a third party must be providing ether on the withdrawal side of a run through Tornado. For this reason, since the prime directive of the Governance "community" surrounding Tornado Cash is ensuring protocol and service stability, mechanisms must exist by which Governance can incentivize "users/validators/nodes" to configure a system around the core protocol contracts, which must act as a bridge between them and users wanting to interface with the protocol. Specifically, this is necessary due to the fee dilemma which has been mentioned in the guide for relayers, which states that a third party must be providing ether on the withdrawal side of a run through Tornado.