p2p: encrypted and authenticated RLPx frame I/O

p2p/handshake.go

@@ -5,12 +5,14 @@ import (
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"hash"
 	"io"
 	"net"
 
 	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
 	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/ecies"
 	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/secp256k1"
+	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto/sha3"
 	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/p2p/discover"
 	"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/rlp"
 )
@@ -38,13 +40,23 @@ func newConn(fd net.Conn, hs *protoHandshake) *conn {
 	return &conn{newFrameRW(fd, msgWriteTimeout), hs}
 }
 
-// encHandshake represents information about the remote end
+// encHandshake contains the state of the encryption handshake.
-// of a connection that is negotiated during the encryption handshake.
 type encHandshake struct {
-	ID         discover.NodeID
+	remoteID             discover.NodeID
-	IngressMAC []byte
+	initiator            bool
-	EgressMAC  []byte
+	initNonce, respNonce []byte
-	Token      []byte
+	dhSharedSecret       []byte
+	randomPrivKey        *ecdsa.PrivateKey
+	remoteRandomPub      *ecdsa.PublicKey
+}
+
+// secrets represents the connection secrets
+// which are negotiated during the encryption handshake.
+type secrets struct {
+	RemoteID              discover.NodeID
+	AES, MAC              []byte
+	EgressMAC, IngressMAC hash.Hash
+	Token                 []byte
 }
 
 // protoHandshake is the RLP structure of the protocol handshake.
@@ -56,6 +68,34 @@ type protoHandshake struct {
 	ID         discover.NodeID
 }
 
+// secrets is called after the handshake is completed.
+// It extracts the connection secrets from the handshake values.
+func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) secrets {
+	sharedSecret := crypto.Sha3(h.dhSharedSecret, crypto.Sha3(h.respNonce, h.initNonce))
+	aesSecret := crypto.Sha3(h.dhSharedSecret, sharedSecret)
+	s := secrets{
+		RemoteID: h.remoteID,
+		AES:      aesSecret,
+		MAC:      crypto.Sha3(h.dhSharedSecret, aesSecret),
+		Token:    crypto.Sha3(sharedSecret),
+	}
+
+	// setup sha3 instances for the MACs
+	mac1 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
+	mac1.Write(xor(s.MAC, h.respNonce))
+	mac1.Write(auth)
+	mac2 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
+	mac2.Write(xor(s.MAC, h.initNonce))
+	mac2.Write(authResp)
+	if h.initiator {
+		s.EgressMAC, s.IngressMAC = mac1, mac2
+	} else {
+		s.EgressMAC, s.IngressMAC = mac2, mac1
+	}
+
+	return s
+}
+
 // setupConn starts a protocol session on the given connection.
 // It runs the encryption handshake and the protocol handshake.
 // If dial is non-nil, the connection the local node is the initiator.
@@ -68,36 +108,47 @@ func setupConn(fd net.Conn, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, our *protoHandshake, dial *di
 }
 
 func setupInboundConn(fd net.Conn, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, our *protoHandshake) (*conn, error) {
-	// var remotePubkey []byte
+	secrets, err := inboundEncHandshake(fd, prv, nil)
-	// sessionToken, remotePubkey, err = inboundEncHandshake(fd, prv, nil)
+	if err != nil {
-	// copy(remoteID[:], remotePubkey)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("encryption handshake failed: %v", err)
+	}
 
-	rw := newFrameRW(fd, msgWriteTimeout)
+	// Run the protocol handshake using authenticated messages.
-	rhs, err := readProtocolHandshake(rw, our)
+	// TODO: move buffering setup here (out of newFrameRW)
+	phsrw := newRlpxFrameRW(fd, secrets)
+	rhs, err := readProtocolHandshake(phsrw, our)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if err := writeProtocolHandshake(rw, our); err != nil {
+	if err := writeProtocolHandshake(phsrw, our); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("protocol write error: %v", err)
 	}
+
+	rw := newFrameRW(fd, msgWriteTimeout)
 	return &conn{rw, rhs}, nil
 }
 
 func setupOutboundConn(fd net.Conn, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, our *protoHandshake, dial *discover.Node) (*conn, error) {
-	// remoteID = dial.ID
+	secrets, err := outboundEncHandshake(fd, prv, dial.ID[:], nil)
-	// sessionToken, err = outboundEncHandshake(fd, prv, remoteID[:], nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("encryption handshake failed: %v", err)
+	}
 
-	rw := newFrameRW(fd, msgWriteTimeout)
+	// Run the protocol handshake using authenticated messages.
-	if err := writeProtocolHandshake(rw, our); err != nil {
+	// TODO: move buffering setup here (out of newFrameRW)
+	phsrw := newRlpxFrameRW(fd, secrets)
+	if err := writeProtocolHandshake(phsrw, our); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("protocol write error: %v", err)
 	}
-	rhs, err := readProtocolHandshake(rw, our)
+	rhs, err := readProtocolHandshake(phsrw, our)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("protocol handshake read error: %v", err)
 	}
 	if rhs.ID != dial.ID {
 		return nil, errors.New("dialed node id mismatch")
 	}
+
+	rw := newFrameRW(fd, msgWriteTimeout)
 	return &conn{rw, rhs}, nil
 }
 
@@ -107,43 +158,48 @@ func setupOutboundConn(fd net.Conn, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, our *protoHandshake,
 // privateKey is the local client's private key
 // remotePublicKey is the remote peer's node ID
 // sessionToken is the token from a previous session with this node.
-func outboundEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remotePublicKey []byte, sessionToken []byte) (
+func outboundEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remotePublicKey []byte, sessionToken []byte) (s secrets, err error) {
-	newSessionToken []byte,
-	err error,
-) {
 	auth, initNonce, randomPrivKey, err := authMsg(prvKey, remotePublicKey, sessionToken)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
 	if _, err = conn.Write(auth); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
 
 	response := make([]byte, rHSLen)
 	if _, err = io.ReadFull(conn, response); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
 	recNonce, remoteRandomPubKey, _, err := completeHandshake(response, prvKey)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
 
-	return newSession(initNonce, recNonce, randomPrivKey, remoteRandomPubKey)
+	h := &encHandshake{
+		initiator:       true,
+		initNonce:       initNonce,
+		respNonce:       recNonce,
+		randomPrivKey:   randomPrivKey,
+		remoteRandomPub: remoteRandomPubKey,
+	}
+	copy(h.remoteID[:], remotePublicKey)
+	return h.secrets(auth, response), nil
 }
 
 // authMsg creates the initiator handshake.
+// TODO: change all the names
 func authMsg(prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remotePubKeyS, sessionToken []byte) (
 	auth, initNonce []byte,
 	randomPrvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey,
 	err error,
 ) {
-	// session init, common to both parties
 	remotePubKey, err := importPublicKey(remotePubKeyS)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
-	var tokenFlag byte // = 0x00
+	var tokenFlag byte
 	if sessionToken == nil {
 		// no session token found means we need to generate shared secret.
 		// ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers
@@ -151,14 +207,13 @@ func authMsg(prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remotePubKeyS, sessionToken []byte) (
 		if sessionToken, err = ecies.ImportECDSA(prvKey).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remotePubKey), sskLen, sskLen); err != nil {
 			return
 		}
-		// tokenFlag = 0x00 // redundant
 	} else {
 		// for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session
 		tokenFlag = 0x01
 	}
 
-	//E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, ecdh-shared-secret^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0)
+	//E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, sha3(ecdh-shared-secret^nonce)) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0)
-	// E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, token^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x1)
+	// E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, sha3(token^nonce)) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x1)
 	// allocate msgLen long message,
 	var msg []byte = make([]byte, authMsgLen)
 	initNonce = msg[authMsgLen-shaLen-1 : authMsgLen-1]
@@ -242,27 +297,32 @@ func completeHandshake(auth []byte, prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (
 //
 // privateKey is the local client's private key
 // sessionToken is the token from a previous session with this node.
-func inboundEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, sessionToken []byte) (
+func inboundEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, sessionToken []byte) (s secrets, err error) {
-	token, remotePubKey []byte,
-	err error,
-) {
 	// we are listening connection. we are responders in the
 	// handshake. Extract info from the authentication. The initiator
 	// starts by sending us a handshake that we need to respond to. so
 	// we read auth message first, then respond.
 	auth := make([]byte, iHSLen)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, auth); err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
 	response, recNonce, initNonce, remotePubKey, randomPrivKey, remoteRandomPubKey, err := authResp(auth, sessionToken, prvKey)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
 	if _, err = conn.Write(response); err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
+		return s, err
 	}
-	token, err = newSession(initNonce, recNonce, randomPrivKey, remoteRandomPubKey)
+
-	return token, remotePubKey, err
+	h := &encHandshake{
+		initiator:       false,
+		initNonce:       initNonce,
+		respNonce:       recNonce,
+		randomPrivKey:   randomPrivKey,
+		remoteRandomPub: remoteRandomPubKey,
+	}
+	copy(h.remoteID[:], remotePubKey)
+	return h.secrets(auth, response), err
 }
 
 // authResp is called by peer if it accepted (but not
@@ -349,23 +409,6 @@ func authResp(auth, sessionToken []byte, prvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) (
 	return
 }
 
-// newSession is called after the handshake is completed. The
-// arguments are values negotiated in the handshake. The return value
-// is a new session Token to be remembered for the next time we
-// connect with this peer.
-func newSession(initNonce, respNonce []byte, privKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) ([]byte, error) {
-	// 3) Now we can trust ecdhe-random-pubk to derive new keys
-	//ecdhe-shared-secret = ecdh.agree(ecdhe-random, remote-ecdhe-random-pubk)
-	pubKey := ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remoteRandomPubKey)
-	dhSharedSecret, err := ecies.ImportECDSA(privKey).GenerateShared(pubKey, sskLen, sskLen)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	sharedSecret := crypto.Sha3(dhSharedSecret, crypto.Sha3(respNonce, initNonce))
-	sessionToken := crypto.Sha3(sharedSecret)
-	return sessionToken, nil
-}
-
 // importPublicKey unmarshals 512 bit public keys.
 func importPublicKey(pubKey []byte) (pubKeyEC *ecdsa.PublicKey, err error) {
 	var pubKey65 []byte

p2p/handshake_test.go

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package p2p
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/rand"
 	"net"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
@@ -69,102 +67,46 @@ func TestSharedSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestCryptoHandshake(t *testing.T) {
-	testCryptoHandshake(newkey(), newkey(), nil, t)
-}
-
-func TestCryptoHandshakeWithToken(t *testing.T) {
-	sessionToken := make([]byte, shaLen)
-	rand.Read(sessionToken)
-	testCryptoHandshake(newkey(), newkey(), sessionToken, t)
-}
-
-func testCryptoHandshake(prv0, prv1 *ecdsa.PrivateKey, sessionToken []byte, t *testing.T) {
-	var err error
-	// pub0 := &prv0.PublicKey
-	pub1 := &prv1.PublicKey
-
-	// pub0s := crypto.FromECDSAPub(pub0)
-	pub1s := crypto.FromECDSAPub(pub1)
-
-	// simulate handshake by feeding output to input
-	// initiator sends handshake 'auth'
-	auth, initNonce, randomPrivKey, err := authMsg(prv0, pub1s, sessionToken)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("%v", err)
-	}
-	// t.Logf("-> %v", hexkey(auth))
-
-	// receiver reads auth and responds with response
-	response, remoteRecNonce, remoteInitNonce, _, remoteRandomPrivKey, remoteInitRandomPubKey, err := authResp(auth, sessionToken, prv1)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("%v", err)
-	}
-	// t.Logf("<- %v\n", hexkey(response))
-
-	// initiator reads receiver's response and the key exchange completes
-	recNonce, remoteRandomPubKey, _, err := completeHandshake(response, prv0)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("completeHandshake error: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// now both parties should have the same session parameters
-	initSessionToken, err := newSession(initNonce, recNonce, randomPrivKey, remoteRandomPubKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("newSession error: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	recSessionToken, err := newSession(remoteInitNonce, remoteRecNonce, remoteRandomPrivKey, remoteInitRandomPubKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("newSession error: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// fmt.Printf("\nauth (%v) %x\n\nresp (%v) %x\n\n", len(auth), auth, len(response), response)
-
-	// fmt.Printf("\nauth %x\ninitNonce %x\nresponse%x\nremoteRecNonce %x\nremoteInitNonce %x\nremoteRandomPubKey %x\nrecNonce %x\nremoteInitRandomPubKey %x\ninitSessionToken %x\n\n", auth, initNonce, response, remoteRecNonce, remoteInitNonce, remoteRandomPubKey, recNonce, remoteInitRandomPubKey, initSessionToken)
-
-	if !bytes.Equal(initNonce, remoteInitNonce) {
-		t.Errorf("nonces do not match")
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(recNonce, remoteRecNonce) {
-		t.Errorf("receiver nonces do not match")
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(initSessionToken, recSessionToken) {
-		t.Errorf("session tokens do not match")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestEncHandshake(t *testing.T) {
 	defer testlog(t).detach()
 
 	prv0, _ := crypto.GenerateKey()
 	prv1, _ := crypto.GenerateKey()
-	pub0s, _ := exportPublicKey(&prv0.PublicKey)
-	pub1s, _ := exportPublicKey(&prv1.PublicKey)
 	rw0, rw1 := net.Pipe()
-	tokens := make(chan []byte)
+	secrets := make(chan secrets)
 
 	go func() {
-		token, err := outboundEncHandshake(rw0, prv0, pub1s, nil)
+		pub1s, _ := exportPublicKey(&prv1.PublicKey)
+		s, err := outboundEncHandshake(rw0, prv0, pub1s, nil)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Errorf("outbound side error: %v", err)
 		}
-		tokens <- token
+		id1 := discover.PubkeyID(&prv1.PublicKey)
+		if s.RemoteID != id1 {
+			t.Errorf("outbound side remote ID mismatch")
+		}
+		secrets <- s
 	}()
 	go func() {
-		token, remotePubkey, err := inboundEncHandshake(rw1, prv1, nil)
+		s, err := inboundEncHandshake(rw1, prv1, nil)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Errorf("inbound side error: %v", err)
 		}
-		if !bytes.Equal(remotePubkey, pub0s) {
+		id0 := discover.PubkeyID(&prv0.PublicKey)
-			t.Errorf("inbound side returned wrong remote pubkey\n  got:  %x\n  want: %x", remotePubkey, pub0s)
+		if s.RemoteID != id0 {
+			t.Errorf("inbound side remote ID mismatch")
 		}
-		tokens <- token
+		secrets <- s
 	}()
 
-	t1, t2 := <-tokens, <-tokens
+	// get computed secrets from both sides
-	if !bytes.Equal(t1, t2) {
+	t1, t2 := <-secrets, <-secrets
-		t.Error("session token mismatch")
+	// don't compare remote node IDs
+	t1.RemoteID, t2.RemoteID = discover.NodeID{}, discover.NodeID{}
+	// flip MACs on one of them so they compare equal
+	t1.EgressMAC, t1.IngressMAC = t1.IngressMAC, t1.EgressMAC
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(t1, t2) {
+		t.Errorf("secrets mismatch:\n t1: %#v\n t2: %#v", t1, t2)
 	}
 }
 

p2p/rlpx.go

@@ -13,24 +13,44 @@ import (
 )
 
 var (
+	// this is used in place of actual frame header data.
+	// TODO: replace this when Msg contains the protocol type code.
 	zeroHeader = []byte{0xC2, 0x80, 0x80}
-	zero16     = make([]byte, 16)
+
+	// sixteen zero bytes
+	zero16 = make([]byte, 16)
 )
 
 type rlpxFrameRW struct {
 	conn io.ReadWriter
+	enc  cipher.Stream
+	dec  cipher.Stream
 
 	macCipher  cipher.Block
 	egressMAC  hash.Hash
 	ingressMAC hash.Hash
 }
 
-func newRlpxFrameRW(conn io.ReadWriter, macSecret []byte, egressMAC, ingressMAC hash.Hash) *rlpxFrameRW {
+func newRlpxFrameRW(conn io.ReadWriter, s secrets) *rlpxFrameRW {
-	cipher, err := aes.NewCipher(macSecret)
+	macc, err := aes.NewCipher(s.MAC)
 	if err != nil {
-		panic("invalid macSecret: " + err.Error())
+		panic("invalid MAC secret: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	encc, err := aes.NewCipher(s.AES)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("invalid AES secret: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	// we use an all-zeroes IV for AES because the key used
+	// for encryption is ephemeral.
+	iv := make([]byte, encc.BlockSize())
+	return &rlpxFrameRW{
+		conn:       conn,
+		enc:        cipher.NewCTR(encc, iv),
+		dec:        cipher.NewCTR(encc, iv),
+		macCipher:  macc,
+		egressMAC:  s.EgressMAC,
+		ingressMAC: s.IngressMAC,
 	}
-	return &rlpxFrameRW{conn: conn, macCipher: cipher, egressMAC: egressMAC, ingressMAC: ingressMAC}
 }
 
 func (rw *rlpxFrameRW) WriteMsg(msg Msg) error {
@@ -41,13 +61,14 @@ func (rw *rlpxFrameRW) WriteMsg(msg Msg) error {
 	fsize := uint32(len(ptype)) + msg.Size
 	putInt24(fsize, headbuf) // TODO: check overflow
 	copy(headbuf[3:], zeroHeader)
+	rw.enc.XORKeyStream(headbuf[:16], headbuf[:16]) // first half is now encrypted
 	copy(headbuf[16:], updateHeaderMAC(rw.egressMAC, rw.macCipher, headbuf[:16]))
 	if _, err := rw.conn.Write(headbuf); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	// write frame, updating the egress MAC while writing to conn.
+	// write encrypted frame, updating the egress MAC while writing to conn.
-	tee := io.MultiWriter(rw.conn, rw.egressMAC)
+	tee := cipher.StreamWriter{S: rw.enc, W: io.MultiWriter(rw.conn, rw.egressMAC)}
 	if _, err := tee.Write(ptype); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -62,7 +83,8 @@ func (rw *rlpxFrameRW) WriteMsg(msg Msg) error {
 
 	// write packet-mac. egress MAC is up to date because
 	// frame content was written to it as well.
-	_, err := rw.conn.Write(rw.egressMAC.Sum(nil))
+	mac := updateHeaderMAC(rw.egressMAC, rw.macCipher, rw.egressMAC.Sum(nil))
+	_, err := rw.conn.Write(mac)
 	return err
 }
 
@@ -72,34 +94,40 @@ func (rw *rlpxFrameRW) ReadMsg() (msg Msg, err error) {
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rw.conn, headbuf); err != nil {
 		return msg, err
 	}
-	fsize := readInt24(headbuf)
+	// verify header mac
-	// ignore protocol type for now
 	shouldMAC := updateHeaderMAC(rw.ingressMAC, rw.macCipher, headbuf[:16])
 	if !hmac.Equal(shouldMAC[:16], headbuf[16:]) {
 		return msg, errors.New("bad header MAC")
 	}
+	rw.dec.XORKeyStream(headbuf[:16], headbuf[:16]) // first half is now decrypted
+	fsize := readInt24(headbuf)
+	// ignore protocol type for now
 
 	// read the frame content
-	framebuf := make([]byte, fsize)
+	var rsize = fsize // frame size rounded up to 16 byte boundary
+	if padding := fsize % 16; padding > 0 {
+		rsize += 16 - padding
+	}
+	framebuf := make([]byte, rsize)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rw.conn, framebuf); err != nil {
 		return msg, err
 	}
-	rw.ingressMAC.Write(framebuf)
+
-	if padding := fsize % 16; padding > 0 {
-		if _, err := io.CopyN(rw.ingressMAC, rw.conn, int64(16-padding)); err != nil {
-			return msg, err
-		}
-	}
 	// read and validate frame MAC. we can re-use headbuf for that.
+	rw.ingressMAC.Write(framebuf)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rw.conn, headbuf); err != nil {
 		return msg, err
 	}
-	if !hmac.Equal(rw.ingressMAC.Sum(nil), headbuf) {
+	shouldMAC = updateHeaderMAC(rw.ingressMAC, rw.macCipher, rw.ingressMAC.Sum(nil))
+	if !hmac.Equal(shouldMAC, headbuf) {
 		return msg, errors.New("bad frame MAC")
 	}
 
+	// decrypt frame content
+	rw.dec.XORKeyStream(framebuf, framebuf)
+
 	// decode message code
-	content := bytes.NewReader(framebuf)
+	content := bytes.NewReader(framebuf[:fsize])
 	if err := rlp.Decode(content, &msg.Code); err != nil {
 		return msg, err
 	}

p2p/rlpx_test.go

@@ -16,14 +16,18 @@ import (
 
 func TestRlpxFrameFake(t *testing.T) {
 	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-	secret := crypto.Sha3()
 	hash := fakeHash([]byte{1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1})
-	rw := newRlpxFrameRW(buf, secret, hash, hash)
+	rw := newRlpxFrameRW(buf, secrets{
+		AES:        crypto.Sha3(),
+		MAC:        crypto.Sha3(),
+		IngressMAC: hash,
+		EgressMAC:  hash,
+	})
 
 	golden := unhex(`
-000006C2808000000000000000000000
+00828ddae471818bb0bfa6b551d1cb42
 01010101010101010101010101010101
-08C40102030400000000000000000000
+ba628a4ba590cb43f7848f41c4382885
 01010101010101010101010101010101
 01010101010101010101010101010101
 `)
@@ -75,27 +79,35 @@ func unhex(str string) []byte {
 
 func TestRlpxFrameRW(t *testing.T) {
 	var (
+		aesSecret      = make([]byte, 16)
 		macSecret      = make([]byte, 16)
 		egressMACinit  = make([]byte, 32)
 		ingressMACinit = make([]byte, 32)
 	)
-	for _, s := range [][]byte{macSecret, egressMACinit, ingressMACinit} {
+	for _, s := range [][]byte{aesSecret, macSecret, egressMACinit, ingressMACinit} {
 		rand.Read(s)
 	}
-
 	conn := new(bytes.Buffer)
 
-	em1 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
+	s1 := secrets{
-	em1.Write(egressMACinit)
+		AES:        aesSecret,
-	im1 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
+		MAC:        macSecret,
-	im1.Write(ingressMACinit)
+		EgressMAC:  sha3.NewKeccak256(),
-	rw1 := newRlpxFrameRW(conn, macSecret, em1, im1)
+		IngressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
+	}
+	s1.EgressMAC.Write(egressMACinit)
+	s1.IngressMAC.Write(ingressMACinit)
+	rw1 := newRlpxFrameRW(conn, s1)
 
-	em2 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
+	s2 := secrets{
-	em2.Write(ingressMACinit)
+		AES:        aesSecret,
-	im2 := sha3.NewKeccak256()
+		MAC:        macSecret,
-	im2.Write(egressMACinit)
+		EgressMAC:  sha3.NewKeccak256(),
-	rw2 := newRlpxFrameRW(conn, macSecret, em2, im2)
+		IngressMAC: sha3.NewKeccak256(),
+	}
+	s2.EgressMAC.Write(ingressMACinit)
+	s2.IngressMAC.Write(egressMACinit)
+	rw2 := newRlpxFrameRW(conn, s2)
 
 	// send some messages
 	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {