couple of fixes to docs in clef (#20900)
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@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ There are two ways that this can be achieved: integrated via Qubes or integrated
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#### 1. Qubes Integrated
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Qubes provdes a facility for inter-qubes communication via `qrexec`. A qube can request to make a cross-qube RPC request
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Qubes provides a facility for inter-qubes communication via `qrexec`. A qube can request to make a cross-qube RPC request
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to another qube. The OS then asks the user if the call is permitted.
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![Example](qubes/qrexec-example.png)
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ This is how [Split GPG](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/split-gpg/) is implemented.
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![Clef via qrexec](qubes/clef_qubes_qrexec.png)
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On the `target` qubes, we need to define the rpc service.
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On the `target` qubes, we need to define the RPC service.
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[qubes.Clefsign](qubes/qubes.Clefsign):
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@ -135,11 +135,11 @@ $ cat newaccnt.json
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$ cat newaccnt.json| qrexec-client-vm debian-work qubes.Clefsign
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```
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This should pop up first a dialog to allow the IPC call:
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A dialog should pop up first to allow the IPC call:
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![one](qubes/qubes_newaccount-1.png)
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Followed by a GTK-dialog to approve the operation
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Followed by a GTK-dialog to approve the operation:
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![two](qubes/qubes_newaccount-2.png)
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@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ However, it comes with a couple of drawbacks:
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- The `Origin` header must be forwarded
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- Information about the remote ip must be added as a `X-Forwarded-For`. However, Clef cannot always trust an `XFF` header,
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since malicious clients may lie about `XFF` in order to fool the http server into believing it comes from another address.
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- Even with a policy in place to allow rpc-calls between `caller` and `target`, there will be several popups:
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- Even with a policy in place to allow RPC calls between `caller` and `target`, there will be several popups:
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- One qubes-specific where the user specifies the `target` vm
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- One clef-specific to approve the transaction
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@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ However, it comes with a couple of drawbacks:
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#### 2. Network integrated
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The second way to set up Clef on a qubes system is to allow networking, and have Clef listen to a port which is accessible
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form other qubes.
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from other qubes.
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![Clef via http](qubes/clef_qubes_http.png)
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@ -193,6 +193,6 @@ to your computer. Over this new network interface, you can SSH into the device.
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Running Clef off a USB armory means that you can use the armory as a very versatile offline computer, which only
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ever connects to a local network between your computer and the device itself.
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Needless to say, the while this model should be fairly secure against remote attacks, an attacker with physical access
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Needless to say, while this model should be fairly secure against remote attacks, an attacker with physical access
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to the USB Armory would trivially be able to extract the contents of the device filesystem.
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