diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 89c9907..b619bd2 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -53,10 +53,12 @@ Package consists of two parts:
    providing ready-to-use:
    - NIST curves secp256r1/P256, secp384r1/P384, secp521r1/P521
    - SECG curve secp256k1
-   - ed25519/curve25519/x25519/ristretto255, edwards448/curve448/x448
+   - ed25519 / curve25519 / x25519 / ristretto255,
+     edwards448 / curve448 / x448
      implementing
      [RFC7748](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748) /
      [RFC8032](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032) /
+     [FIPS 186-5](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/5/final) /
      [ZIP215](https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215) standards
    - pairing-friendly curves bls12-381, bn254
 2. [Abstract](#abstract-api), zero-dependency EC algorithms
@@ -118,11 +120,23 @@ const isValid = schnorr.verify(sig, msg, pub);
 
 ed25519 module has ed25519ctx / ed25519ph variants,
 x25519 ECDH and [ristretto255](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448).
-It follows [ZIP215](https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215) and [can be used in consensus-critical applications](https://hdevalence.ca/blog/2020-10-04-its-25519am):
+
+Default `verify` behavior follows [ZIP215](https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215) and
+[can be used in consensus-critical applications](https://hdevalence.ca/blog/2020-10-04-its-25519am).
+It does not affect security.
+
+There is `zip215: false` option that switches verification criteria to RFC8032 / FIPS 186-5.
 
 ```ts
 import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
 
+const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+const pub = ed25519.getPublicKey(priv);
+const msg = new TextEncoder().encode('hello');
+const sig = ed25519.sign(msg, priv);
+ed25519.verify(sig, msg, pub); // Default mode: follows ZIP215
+ed25519.verify(sig, msg, pub, { zip215: false }); // RFC8032 / FIPS 186-5
+
 // Variants from RFC8032: with context, prehashed
 import { ed25519ctx, ed25519ph } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
 
diff --git a/src/abstract/edwards.ts b/src/abstract/edwards.ts
index 4feace6..f785ede 100644
--- a/src/abstract/edwards.ts
+++ b/src/abstract/edwards.ts
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ export type CurveType = BasicCurve<bigint> & {
   mapToCurve?: (scalar: bigint[]) => AffinePoint<bigint>; // for hash-to-curve standard
 };
 
+// verification rule is either zip215 or rfc8032 / nist186-5. Consult fromHex:
+const VERIFY_DEFAULT = { zip215: true };
+
 function validateOpts(curve: CurveType) {
   const opts = validateBasic(curve);
   ut.validateObject(
@@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ export function twistedEdwards(curveDef: CurveType): CurveFn {
   const {
     Fp,
     n: CURVE_ORDER,
-    prehash: preHash,
+    prehash: prehash,
     hash: cHash,
     randomBytes,
     nByteLength,
@@ -352,7 +355,7 @@ export function twistedEdwards(curveDef: CurveType): CurveFn {
 
     // Converts hash string or Uint8Array to Point.
     // Uses algo from RFC8032 5.1.3.
-    static fromHex(hex: Hex, strict = true): Point {
+    static fromHex(hex: Hex, zip215 = false): Point {
       const { d, a } = CURVE;
       const len = Fp.BYTES;
       hex = ensureBytes('pointHex', hex, len); // copy hex to a new array
@@ -364,8 +367,8 @@ export function twistedEdwards(curveDef: CurveType): CurveFn {
         // y=0 is allowed
       } else {
         // RFC8032 prohibits >= p, but ZIP215 doesn't
-        if (strict) assertInRange(y, Fp.ORDER); // strict=true [1..P-1] (2^255-19-1 for ed25519)
-        else assertInRange(y, MASK); // strict=false [1..MASK-1] (2^256-1 for ed25519)
+        if (zip215) assertInRange(y, MASK); // zip215=true [1..P-1] (2^255-19-1 for ed25519)
+        else assertInRange(y, Fp.ORDER); // zip215=false [1..MASK-1] (2^256-1 for ed25519)
       }
 
       // Ed25519: x² = (y²-1)/(dy²+1) mod p. Ed448: x² = (y²-1)/(dy²-1) mod p. Generic case:
@@ -427,13 +430,13 @@ export function twistedEdwards(curveDef: CurveType): CurveFn {
   // int('LE', SHA512(dom2(F, C) || msgs)) mod N
   function hashDomainToScalar(context: Hex = new Uint8Array(), ...msgs: Uint8Array[]) {
     const msg = ut.concatBytes(...msgs);
-    return modN_LE(cHash(domain(msg, ensureBytes('context', context), !!preHash)));
+    return modN_LE(cHash(domain(msg, ensureBytes('context', context), !!prehash)));
   }
 
   /** Signs message with privateKey. RFC8032 5.1.6 */
   function sign(msg: Hex, privKey: Hex, options: { context?: Hex } = {}): Uint8Array {
     msg = ensureBytes('message', msg);
-    if (preHash) msg = preHash(msg); // for ed25519ph etc.
+    if (prehash) msg = prehash(msg); // for ed25519ph etc.
     const { prefix, scalar, pointBytes } = getExtendedPublicKey(privKey);
     const r = hashDomainToScalar(options.context, prefix, msg); // r = dom2(F, C) || prefix || PH(M)
     const R = G.multiply(r).toRawBytes(); // R = rG
@@ -444,17 +447,27 @@ export function twistedEdwards(curveDef: CurveType): CurveFn {
     return ensureBytes('result', res, nByteLength * 2); // 64-byte signature
   }
 
-  const verifyOpts: { context?: Hex; strict?: boolean } = { strict: false };
+  const verifyOpts: { context?: Hex; zip215?: boolean } = VERIFY_DEFAULT;
   function verify(sig: Hex, msg: Hex, publicKey: Hex, options = verifyOpts): boolean {
+    const { context, zip215 } = options;
     const len = Fp.BYTES; // Verifies EdDSA signature against message and public key. RFC8032 5.1.7.
     sig = ensureBytes('signature', sig, 2 * len); // An extended group equation is checked.
-    msg = ensureBytes('message', msg); // ZIP215 compliant, which means not fully RFC8032 compliant.
-    if (preHash) msg = preHash(msg); // for ed25519ph, etc
-    const A = Point.fromHex(publicKey, false); // Check for s bounds, hex validity
-    const R = Point.fromHex(sig.slice(0, len), options.strict); // R <P (RFC8032) or <2^256 (ZIP215)
+    msg = ensureBytes('message', msg);
+    if (prehash) msg = prehash(msg); // for ed25519ph, etc
+
     const s = ut.bytesToNumberLE(sig.slice(len, 2 * len));
-    const SB = G.multiplyUnsafe(s); // 0 <= s < l is done inside
-    const k = hashDomainToScalar(options.context, R.toRawBytes(), A.toRawBytes(), msg);
+    // zip215: true is good for consensus-critical apps and allows points < 2^256
+    // zip215: false follows RFC8032 / NIST186-5 and restricts points to CURVE.p
+    let A, R, SB;
+    try {
+      A = Point.fromHex(publicKey, zip215);
+      R = Point.fromHex(sig.slice(0, len), zip215);
+      SB = G.multiplyUnsafe(s); // 0 <= s < l is done inside
+    } catch (error) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    const k = hashDomainToScalar(context, R.toRawBytes(), A.toRawBytes(), msg);
     const RkA = R.add(A.multiplyUnsafe(k));
     // [8][S]B = [8]R + [8][k]A'
     return RkA.subtract(SB).clearCofactor().equals(Point.ZERO);
diff --git a/test/ed25519.test.js b/test/ed25519.test.js
index 25a5ed3..31c3ee9 100644
--- a/test/ed25519.test.js
+++ b/test/ed25519.test.js
@@ -305,23 +305,25 @@ describe('ed25519', () => {
 
   // https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215
   // Vectors from https://gist.github.com/hdevalence/93ed42d17ecab8e42138b213812c8cc7
-  should('ZIP-215 compliance tests/should pass all of them', () => {
-    const str = utf8ToBytes('Zcash');
-    for (let v of zip215) {
-      let noble = false;
-      try {
-        noble = ed.verify(v.sig_bytes, str, v.vk_bytes);
-      } catch (e) {
-        noble = false;
+  describe('ZIP215', () => {
+    should('pass all compliance tests', () => {
+      const str = utf8ToBytes('Zcash');
+      for (let v of zip215) {
+        let noble = false;
+        try {
+          noble = ed.verify(v.sig_bytes, str, v.vk_bytes);
+        } catch (e) {
+          noble = false;
+        }
+        deepStrictEqual(noble, v.valid_zip215, JSON.stringify(v));
       }
-      deepStrictEqual(noble, v.valid_zip215, JSON.stringify(v));
-    }
-  });
-  should('ZIP-215 compliance tests/disallows sig.s >= CURVE.n', () => {
-    // sig.R = BASE, sig.s = N+1
-    const sig =
-      '5866666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666eed3f55c1a631258d69cf7a2def9de1400000000000000000000000000000010';
-    throws(() => ed.verify(sig, 'deadbeef', Point.BASE));
+    });
+    should('disallow sig.s >= CURVE.n', () => {
+      // sig.R = BASE, sig.s = N+1
+      const sig =
+        '5866666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666eed3f55c1a631258d69cf7a2def9de1400000000000000000000000000000010';
+      deepStrictEqual(ed.verify(sig, 'deadbeef', Point.BASE), false);
+    });
   });
 
   // should('X25519/getSharedSecret() should be commutative', () => {
@@ -403,9 +405,7 @@ describe('ed25519', () => {
     s = numberToBytesLE(s, 32);
 
     const sig_invalid = concatBytes(R, s);
-    throws(() => {
-      ed25519.verify(sig_invalid, message, publicKey);
-    });
+    deepStrictEqual(ed25519.verify(sig_invalid, message, publicKey), false);
   });
 
   should('not accept point without z, t', () => {