181 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
181 lines
6.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Advanced setup
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description: More advanced ways to set up Clef for additional security
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---
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Clef is a signer and account management tool that is external to Geth. This means it can be run as a separate process or even on a separate machine to the one running Geth, for example on secure hardware that is not connected to any external network, or on secure virtual machines.
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This page describes how Clef can be used with Qubes OS to provide a more secure setup than a normal laptop. Using Clef with USBArmory hardware is also briefly described.
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## Qubes OS
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### Background
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The Qubes operating system configures a set of virtual machines for different purposes such as:
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- personal
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- Your personal email, browsing etc
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- work
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- Work email etc
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- vault
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- a VM without network access, where gpg-keys and/or keepass credentials are stored.
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A couple of dedicated virtual machines handle externalities:
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- sys-net provides networking to all other (network-enabled) machines
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- sys-firewall handles firewall rules
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- sys-usb handles USB devices, and can map usb-devices to certain qubes.
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The goal of this document is to describe how we can set up Clef to provide secure transaction signing from a `vault` vm, to another networked qube which runs Dapps.
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### Setup
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There are two ways that this can be achieved: integrated via Qubes or integrated via networking.
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#### 1. Qubes Integrated
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Qubes provides a facility for inter-qubes communication via `qrexec`. A qube can request to make a cross-qube RPC request to another qube. The OS then asks the user if the call is permitted.
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A policy-file can be created to allow such interaction. On the `target` domain, a service is invoked which can read the `stdin` from the `client` qube.
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This is how [Split GPG](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/split-gpg/) is implemented. Clef can be set up in the same way:
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##### Server
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On the `target` qubes, we need to define the RPC service.
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```bash
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#!/bin/bash
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SIGNER_BIN="/home/user/tools/clef/clef"
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SIGNER_CMD="/home/user/tools/gtksigner/gtkui.py -s $SIGNER_BIN"
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# Start clef if not already started
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if [ ! -S /home/user/.clef/clef.ipc ]; then
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$SIGNER_CMD &
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sleep 1
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fi
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# Should be started by now
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if [ -S /home/user/.clef/clef.ipc ]; then
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# Post incoming request to HTTP channel
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curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST -d @- http://localhost:8550 2>/dev/null
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fi
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```
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This RPC service is not complete (see notes about HTTP headers below), but works as a proof-of-concept. It will forward the data received on `stdin` (forwarded by the OS) to Clef's HTTP channel.
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It would have been possible to send data directly to the `/home/user/.clef/.clef.ipc` socket via e.g `nc -U /home/user/.clef/clef.ipc`, but the reason for sending the request data over `HTTP` instead of `IPC` is for the ability to forward `HTTP` headers.
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To enable the service:
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```bash
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sudo cp qubes.Clefsign /etc/qubes-rpc/
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sudo chmod +x /etc/qubes-rpc/ qubes.Clefsign
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```
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This setup uses [gtksigner](https://github.com/holiman/gtksigner), which is a very minimal GTK-based UI that works well with minimal requirements.
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##### Client
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On the `client` qube, a listener is required to receive the request from the Dapp, and proxy it.
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```python
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"""
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This implements a dispatcher which listens to localhost:8550, and proxies
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requests via qrexec to the service qubes.EthSign on a target domain
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"""
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import http.server
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import socketserver,subprocess
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PORT=8550
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TARGET_DOMAIN= 'debian-work'
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class Dispatcher(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
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def do_POST(self):
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post_data = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers['Content-Length']))
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p = subprocess.Popen(['/usr/bin/qrexec-client-vm',TARGET_DOMAIN,'qubes.Clefsign'],stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
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output = p.communicate(post_data)[0]
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self.wfile.write(output)
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with socketserver.TCPServer(("",PORT), Dispatcher) as httpd:
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print("Serving at port", PORT)
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httpd.serve_forever()
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```
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#### Testing
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To test the flow, with `debian-work` as the `target`:
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```bash
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$ cat newaccnt.json
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{ "id": 0, "jsonrpc": "2.0","method": "account_new","params": []}
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$ cat newaccnt.json| qrexec-client-vm debian-work qubes.Clefsign
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```
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A dialog should pop up first to allow the IPC call:
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Followed by a GTK-dialog to approve the operation:
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To test the full flow, start the client wrapper on the `client` qube:
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```
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[user@work qubes]$ python3 qubes-client.py
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```
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Make the request over http (`client` qube):
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```
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[user@work clef]$ cat newaccnt.json | curl -X POST -d @- http://localhost:8550
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```
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And it should show the same popups again.
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##### Pros and cons
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The benefits of this setup are:
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- This is the qubes-os intended model for inter-qube communication,
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- and thus benefits from qubes-os dialogs and policies for user approval
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However, it comes with a couple of drawbacks:
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- The `qubes-gpg-client` must forward the http request via RPC to the `target` qube. When doing so, the proxy
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will either drop important headers, or replace them.
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- The `Host` header is most likely `localhost`
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- The `Origin` header must be forwarded
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- Information about the remote ip must be added as a `X-Forwarded-For`. However, Clef cannot always trust an `XFF` header,
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since malicious clients may lie about `XFF` in order to fool the http server into believing it comes from another address.
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- Even with a policy in place to allow RPC calls between `caller` and `target`, there will be several popups:
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- One qubes-specific where the user specifies the `target` vm
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- One clef-specific to approve the transaction
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#### 2. Network integrated
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The second way to set up Clef on a qubes system is to allow networking, and have Clef listen to a port which is accessible from other qubes.
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## USBArmory
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The [USB armory](https://inversepath.com/usbarmory) is an open source hardware design with an 800 MHz ARM processor. It is a pocket-sized computer. When inserted into a laptop, it identifies itself as a USB network interface, basically adding another network to your computer that can be used to SSH into the device.
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Running Clef off a USB armory means that the armory can be used as a very versatile offline computer, which only ever connects to a local network between the local computer and the device itself.
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Needless to say, while this model should be fairly secure against remote attacks, an attacker with physical access to the USB Armory would trivially be able to extract the contents of the device filesystem.
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## Summary
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This page introduced two ways to setup Clef that give additional security compared to running on a normal laptop.
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